Stack Memory Buffer Overflow Protection based on Duplication and Randomization  by Alouneh, Sahel et al.
 Procedia Computer Science  21 ( 2013 )  250 – 256 
1877-0509 © 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
Selection and peer-review under responsibility of Elhadi M. Shakshuki
doi: 10.1016/j.procs.2013.09.033 
ScienceDirect
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +96264294122; fax: +96264294122. 
         E-mail address: sahel.alouneh@gju.edu.jo 
The 4th International Conference on Emerging Ubiquitous Systems and Pervasive 
Networks (EUSPN-2013) 
Stack Memory Buffer Overflow Protection Based on 
Duplication and Randomization 
Sahel Alouneh1, Mazen Kharbutli2, Rana AlQurem2 
1German Jordanian University, 2Jordan University of Science and Technology, 
sahel.alouneh@gju.edu.jo, kharbutli@just.edu.jo, rana_alqurem@yahoo.com  
 
Abstract 
With software systems continuously growing in size and complexity, the number and variety of security 
vulnerabilities in those systems is increasing in an alarming rate. Vulnerabilities in the program’s stack are commonly 
exploited by attackers in the form of stack-based attacks. In this paper, a software based solution for stack-based 
vulnerabilities and attacks is proposed and implemented. The proposed solution involves creating a new patch tool 
that fixes a wide-range of stack related vulnerabilities in the existing applications. The basic idea of our approach is to 
implement a patch tool that makes multiple copies of the return addresses in the stack, and then randomizes the 
location of all copies in addition to their number. All duplicate copies are updated and checked in parallel such that 
any mismatch between any of these copies would indicate a possible attack attempt and would trigger an exception. 
The results of our implementation show high protection against integer overflow and buffer overflow attacks. 
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1. Introduction 
Nowadays, security is one of the major concerns for computer users. Computer attacks usually exploit 
vulnerabilities in the software applications that take focus on space and performance in their design 
consideration over safety.  
Buffer overflow in the program’s stack is a very common vulnerable place for those attacks to be 
applicable [1]. The main objective of the attacker is usually to change the control flow of the program, 
allowing the attacker to execute arbitrary code such as opening a new shell with the same access rights to 
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the system as of that process attacked. If the process has a root access, so will the attacker in the new 
shell, leaving the whole system open for any kind of manipulation [2].  
Buffer overflow attacks make up approximately half of all software security vulnerabilities [3, 4]. 
According to statistics from the Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination Center at Carnegie 
Mellon University (CERT) [5], the number of reported vulnerabilities in software has increased by a 
factor of about 10x in the period between year 2000 and 2012 as shown in Figure 1. 
 
 
Fig.1. Software vulnerabilities reported to CERT 
Such attacks are easily performed as evident by their widespread compared to other forms of attacks. 
Since most of stack based buffer overflow attacks lead to a compromised return address, our proposed 
solution focused on protecting the stack from attacks against the return addresses. Many approaches have 
been proposed to protect against stack based attacks, especially to prevent compromised return address. 
The diversity of all previous proposed mechanism can be categorized into two main different solutions: 
Software-based [7-16] and Hardware-based [17- 22]. Software solutions focus on existing source code 
while Hardware solutions need major changes in the architecture.  
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a literature review for solutions that are related 
to our work and also compare them with our proposed solution. Our proposed solution and the 
implementation are discussed in Section 3. The simulation results and evaluation of our software solution 
is presented in Section 4. Finally, the discussion in Section 5 summarizes and concludes the paper. 
2. Related Work 
In this Section we present and discuss the main proposed approaches that protects against stack based 
attacks, and especially in preventing the compromise of the return address. The defense techniques are 
categorized into two main types: software based or hardware based solutions. 
2.1. Software Solution 
Software defense mechanisms are widely used and more attractive for computer users since it is mostly 
independent of operating system and it does not require adding new hardware or changing in the 
architecture. Most of available software defense mechanisms that protect the stack against buffer 
overflow attacks are implemented as compiler extensions. Therefore, they require the source code of the 
vulnerable programs so they can be re-compiled. This requirement is very difficult in some cases 
especially with legacy applications and commercial software. Examples of software based solutions are 
found in references [7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16]. 
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2.2. Hardware Solution 
Although hardware solutions may show more resistance against buffer overflow attacks in some cases, 
it is not a favorable by computer users. All current hardware solutions require a specific hardware or 
configuration or the both to be implemented. Examples of hardware based solutions are found in 
references [17, 18, 19, and 20]. 
 
3. Approach 
In this paper, we propose a general software solution for stack-based vulnerabilities and attacks. Our 
goal is to provide a protection and at the same time maintaining high performance and lowest cost. 
We create a new patch tool that fixes a wide-range of stack related vulnerabilities in existing 
applications. Mainly, our solution depends on duplication and randomization of the new stack locations 
where the return addresses will be stored and checked. Our solution is able to detect and prevent any type 
of attacks against return addresses on the stack. The idea behind our proposed solution is to create random 
number of copies of the return address on the stack, then allocating random stack location for each copy 
of the return address, and then start storing these copies from random offset within each allocated stack in 
each function prologue. Before the function return, all duplicate copies are checked in parallel such that 
any mismatch between any of these copies would indicate a possible attack attempt and would raise an 
exception. At run time, the secure program will create random number of instances of return addresses in 
the stack, called Mirror Return Address Stacks (MRAS), in the heap memory. The number of copies is (3 
to 5) and locations of these MRAS structures is randomized based on the process ID, date and time, 
machine ID. Therefore, the number and locations of these MRAS structures will differ between different 
instances of the same program. When a return address is to be pushed onto the stack, copies are also 
pushed onto the MRAS structures. When the return address is to be used, all copies are checked for 
integrity. 
3.1. Algorithm  
Our proposed approach involves creating a new patch tool that fixes stack related vulnerabilities in 
existing binaries. The input is an assembly file which is extracted from the vulnerable executable binary 
file using an appropriate disassemble tool. The output is an enhanced assembly file with improved stack 
protection and security. This assembly file can then be changed back into an executable binary using the 
assembler. Figure 2 shows the main procedures to implement our proposed solution from vulnerable 
binary file to more secure binary file passing through three steps. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Main steps to implement our proposed solution 
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3.2. Implementation of our Patch Tool
We create a new patch tool that fixes a wide-range of stack related vulnerabilities in existing
applications. The input to our patch tool is an assembly file which is disassembled from the vulnerable
binary file using objdump disassembler. The output is an optimized assembly file with improved stack
protection and security. This assembly file can then be re-compiled into an executable binary using the
assembler. Our new patch tool is implemented and written to work as summarized in Figure 3.
Fig .3. The implementation steps of our patch tool.
As we discussed above, the input to our patch tool is the output assembly file form Objdump
disassembler. At this point, we faced a difficult problem since the output assembly file of objdump is not 
suitable for the purpose of compilation, so it cannot be used to re-create a binary file. Therefore, we 
convert the assembly file of objdump format to an x86 assembly file which is valid for compilation. The
conversion has been done on several stages. Since objdump uses the address of variable instead of its
name as operands in the assembly instructions, and x86 uses the name of variable, we should replace the
address of variable by its name. The first stage of conversion involves storing the variables of BSS and 
TEXT segments that exist in dynamic table. The variables are saved in linked list called VARIABLE. Each
address that used in assembly instruction during the code is compared with all addresses that stored in 
VARIABLE linked list and if it exists then the address is replaced by the name of variable of matched 
address. For the variables of BSS segment only, we insert a definition for each variable at the end of the
output file that contains the .comm keyword along with the variable name, size, and alignment.
In the second stage, we scanned the input file to look for the section that includes all important labels
that are used by the instructions during the code. This section in Objdump file is called .rodata section. The
column on left-most contains the start addresses of .rodata section. In x86 assembly file, each label has a 
unique ID, therefore we used counter of 3 digits for labels IDs starting with LC000. To derive the needed
labels for x86 assembly file from .rodata section in objdump file, we save the first start address as
START_ADDRESS variable and the last address as END_ADDRESS which will be used later. In 
addition, the hexadecimal values are stored in HEXA_VALUE array and the whole characters in the right-
most column are stored in the DATA_SECTION array. Figure 4 shows the labels in x86 assembly file that 
is derived from .rodata section.
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As it has been discussed in the second stage, when the data section is converted to labels, four 
variables are saved: 
• START_ADDRESS is the start address of characters in data section. 
• DATA_SECTION array of type char contains all characters in data section 
• HEXA_VALUE array of type char contains all Hexadecimal values in data section. 
• LABEL_INDEX array of type int contains the index where the first character in each label is  
         stored in DATA_SECTION array. 
It is worth to note that our patch tool solves the problem of compilation by converting the input file 
from objdump format that cannot be compiled into an x86 compatible assemblers. Nevertheless, our 
generated assembly file is still vulnerable to stack-based attacks and no protection is provided yet to the 
input application. As we discussed earlier in this paper, stack-based attacks exploit vulnerabilities in 
software programs such as buffer overflow and especially programs written in C/C++ language since it 
does not perform boundary checking of arrays. Such attacks aim to overwrite the return address by an 
address that points to a malicious code which may cause serious problems. In this phase, our patch tool 
provides the generated x86 assembly file from previous phase with three levels of security to protect return 
addresses comprehensively on stack against all types of return address attacks. These security levels are 
based on randomizing and duplicating the locations where the return addresses will be stored.       
At run time, a random number between (1 and 5) is saved in nCopies variable. Then, nCopies of instances 
of return address stacks are created, called Mirror Return Address Stacks (MRAS), in the heap memory 
using sbrk( ) system call. Every MRAS has size of 10k bytes. Finally, the offset of each MRAS is also 
randomized such that the start location to store return addresses is different among all mirror stacks. The 
number nCopies, locations, and offsets of these MRAS structures are randomized based on the process ID, 
date and time, machine ID, etc. Therefore, the number, locations, and offsets of these MRAS structures 
will change between different instances of the same program.  
4. Evaluation 
As a proof of concept, our software tool is tested using several known programs to verify the 
performance overhead. In next section we used the most common stack based attacks to verify the 
correctness and the level of protection of our SOFTWARE TOOL. To test the performance overhead we 
ran several micro benchmarks. We collected the results of running programs instrumented with and 
without the code that implements the stack protection MRAS. All tests were run on a single machine 
(Intel(R) Core(TM)2 Duo CPU T5750@2.00GHz, 3064MB RAM, GNU/Linux fedora9). The GCC 
LC000: 
 .string "the original matrix is :" 
LC001: 
 .string "(%d,%d)=%f\t" 
LC002: 
 .string "THE DETERMINANT OF THE ABOVE 
MATRIX IS: %f \n" 
LC003: 
 .string "the result matrix is:" 
LC004: 
 .string "(%d,%d)=%f\t" 
LC005: 
 .long  0 
 .long  10745291 
LC006: 
 .long  0 
 .long  -6320914 
Fig.4. The Labels in x86 assembly file. 
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compiler has been used to instrument assembler code with new instructions. The benchmarks show that 
this implementation experiences a significant slow-down factor of between 1% to 170% as shown in 
Table 1. The result of run time in Table 1 is the average of 50 runs for each program. There was no need
to do more run because they were close in 1% to each other. The memory overhead of our tool is in range
of 30 to 50 KB such we create 3 to 5 new stacks at size of 10 KB to protect return address.
Micro Benchmark Runtime without MRAS(s) Runtime without MRAS(s) Overhead
Bubble Sort for 100000 numbers 72.063 73.462 1%
Sorting Algorithm for 20000
number by 6 algorithms
53.256 54.073 1%
Factorial for 10000000 numbers 109.851 109.874 16%
Matrix Inverse of 11x11 49.127 74.427 51%
Fibonacci for 100000 numbers 54.661 146.623 170%
Table 1. Micro Benchmarks results of our implementation
The MRAS implementation is affected by different increase of the execution time when compared to
reference time in different programs as shown in Figure 5. That is mostly due to the number of function 
calls in the program such that the overhead is increasing as the number of function calls is increasing in
program. In addition, the programs that contain recursive function have overhead higher than programs
that do not contain recursive function. We conclude from this, that this type of protection instructions are 
technically feasible and fast. As we discussed in our implementation in section 3, we add our protection 
instruction before each called function and in the end of each called function. Therefore, as the number of 
called function increases in the program, the accumulative execution time of program will increase too. 
To verify the protection level of our software tool, we tested it using known types of stack based attacks 
against return address.
Fig. 5 Run time of macro programs with and without MRAS protection.
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5. Conclusion 
In this research, we proposed, implemented a general approach to achieve full protection for stack 
return addresses from all types of attacks. The main idea in our solution is to create a random number of 
copies of stack return addresses and store them at random locations. When a pointer is used, all copies are 
read and compared. In order for an attack to succeed, the attacker must know the number of copies, their 
locations, and be able to modify all of them simultaneously. This is an extremely difficult process. The 
proposed software tool was tested using several kinds of known micro benchmarks to verify its 
performance and the results show a small overhead comparing to reference time. Moreover, the software 
tool proved a high protection against integer overflow attack and buffer overflow attack. 
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